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Abstract 
 
This paper provides an introduction to the field of evolutionary economics with emphasis on the 
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evolutionary theory of household behavior is to improve upon the neoclassical theory of 
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bounded rationality and satisficing and by incorporating the reaction of households to the 
introduction of new goods and services.  The paper concludes with a brief discussion of loss 
aversion and self-interest vs. altruism. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
It is my great honor and privilege to have been appointed to the Vea Family Professorial Chair 
in Technology and Evolutionary Economics Centennial in the School of Economics at the 
University of the Philippines and to have this opportunity to deliver this professorial lecture 
before such a large and distinguished audience. 
 
 
THE VEA FAMILY 
 
Before starting my lecture, I would like to say a few words about two members of the Vea 
Family, the family that endowed the Chair to which I was appointed—Mr. Orlando B. Vea and Dr. 
Reynaldo B. Vea.  Neither of them needs any introduction, but to introduce them briefly, Mr. 
Orlando B. Vea was born in 1951 to a father who was a civil servant and a mother who was a 
schoolteacher.  He had a strong interest in science and technology as a child, but he majored in 
Economics in college and received his B.A. in Economics cum laude from the School of 
Economics of the University of the Philippines in 1970.  Mr. Vea co-founded Smart 
Communications, Inc., the Philippines’ pioneer and still leading wireless services provider, in 
1991, served as its first President and CEO until 1999, then after Smart’s acquisition by PLDT, 
he served as head of the PLDT Group’s media and content businesses as President and CEO 
of MediaQuest Holdings, Inc., before returning to Smart Communications, Inc., as Chief 
Wireless Advisor in 2008. Mr. Vea is one of the most distinguished alumni of this School in 
addition to being one of the leading technology entrepreneurs in the Philippines.   
 
Turning to Dr. Reynaldo B. Vea, the younger brother of Orlando, he is equally accomplished 
and also has a technology connection.  He received his B.S. in Mechanical Engineering magna 
cum laude from the University of the Philippines in 1978, an M.S. in Naval Architecture and 
Marine Engineering from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1981, and a Ph.D. in 
Engineering from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1991.  He served as Naval Architect 
and Marine Engineer at a number of U.S., companies and as professor and dean of the College 
of Engineering of the University of the Philippines and is now President and Chief Executive 
Officer of the Mapua Institute of Technology, one of the leading technological institutions in the 
Philippines. 
 
Since both Vea brothers are leaders in the technology field, it is fitting that the Vea family 
graciously endowed two technology-related Professorial Chairs in the University of the 
Philippines in 2008 in connection with the university’s centennial celebration: the Vea Family 
Professorial Chair in “Technology for All” in the College of Engineering and the Vea Family 
Professorial Chair in Technology and Evolutionary Economics in the School of Economics.  We 
are all truly grateful to the Vea family for its great generosity and for its promotion of teaching 
and research in technology, and I am very honored and humbled to have been named to one of 
the two prestigious Chairs endowed by the Vea Family. 
 
Given that the title of the Chair to which I have been appointed is the Vea Family Professorial 
Chair in Technology and Evolutionary Economics Centennial, I feel obligated to speak about 
either technology or evolutionary economics.  Given that my primary expertise is household 
behavior, I have decided to speak on the topic of “Evolutionary Economics and Household 
Behavior.”  But before talking about this topic, I would like to talk briefly about what economics is, 
what evolution is, and what evolutionary economics is. 
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WHAT IS EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS? 
 
Economics is a science that studies human behavior but so are the other social sciences such 
as anthropology, history, law, political science, psychology, and sociology.  What currently 
distinguishes economics from the other social sciences is that it uses more mathematics and 
statistics, constructing rigorous theoretical models to describe human behavior and testing 
these models through rigorous statistical analysis.  Thus, economics is much closer to the 
natural sciences than the other social sciences in terms of the methodology it uses. 
 
Since economics is so close to the natural sciences in terms of the methodology used, it is not 
surprising that concepts from the natural sciences are very often incorporated into economics. 
For most of the previous century, physics was the natural science whose methods economics 
sought to emulate the most closely.1  In more recent decades, however, economists have 
shown increasing interest in biological concepts and methods, partly fulfilling Alfred Marshall’s 
well-known assertion that biology, not mechanics, is the “true Mecca” of economics.  One 
excellent example of this trend is evolutionary economics, which is the incorporation of 
evolutionary biology into economics.    
 
As I am sure you already know, the theory of evolution was developed by the great British 
biologist Charles Darwin (1809-1882) in his seminal book On the Origin of Species (Darwin, 
1859), which was first published in 1859.  According Darwin’s theory, species evolve over time, 
with traits adapted to their specific environment becoming more and more dominant and 
disadvantageous traits being gradually phased out.  For example, in a certain environment (say, 
a habitat with many tall trees), giraffes with long necks will be more likely to survive and 
procreate than giraffes with short necks because they can reach leaves that are higher up in the 
tree, and hence giraffes with long necks will gradually come to dominate giraffes with short 
necks, eventually causing the latter to become totally extinct.  This phenomenon is also called 
"natural selection" or "survival of the fittest." 
 
Social scientists have been incorporating concepts from evolutionary biology into human 
behavior in general and economic behavior in particular since soon after Darwin unveiled his 
theory more than a century and a half ago.  For example, the eminent British philosopher 
Herbert Spencer (1820-1903) argued in his book First Principles of a New System of Philosophy 
(Spencer, 1862/2000), which was first published in 1862, just three years after Darwin published 
On the Origin of Species, that evolutionary processes are at work throughout the cosmos, 
applying to everything from stars and galaxies to biological organisms and human social 
organization.  The name of Herbert Spencer is virtually synonymous with Social Darwinism, a 
social theory that applies the concept of evolution to human society (in particular to laissez-faire 
capitalistic societies) and argues that the “strong” (however defined) would see their wealth and 
power increase whereas the “weak” (however defined) would see their wealth and power 
decrease and perhaps perish altogether.  Social Darwinism has acquired a bad name for itself 
(perhaps deservingly so) because it has been used to justify laissez-faire capitalism, racism, 
and preservation of the status quo, but Spencer deserves credit nonetheless for being perhaps 
the first scholar to apply concepts from evolutionary biology to human behavior generally and 
economic behavior in particular. 
 
                                                 
1 This is discussed and critiqued most extensively by Mirowski (1989).  Fabella (2013) criticizes economists’ adulation 
of physics. 
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As another example, Karl Marx (1818-1883), the great German philosopher, economist, and 
revolutionary socialist, developed a theory of economic development that also contains 
elements of evolutionary biology that informed his work including Das Kapital (Marx, 1867-94).  
Marx’s evolutionary theory is most explicitly summarized in the introduction to his Contribution to 
the Critique of Political Economy (Marx, 1859).  Here, he argues that economic systems as a 
whole evolve over the course of history, with superior economic systems replacing inferior ones 
as the latter are beset by contradictions between technological progress and emergent human 
possibilities on the one hand and inefficient property rights on the other, which prevent them 
from surviving over the long term.  In Marx's scheme, feudalism was replaced by capitalism, 
which in turn would eventually be replaced by socialism due to evolutionary forces.  
 
As yet another example, the Austrian-American economist Joseph Schumpeter (1883-1950), 
one of the most influential economists of the twentieth century, applied the concept of evolution 
to innovation or technology in his books The Theory of Economic Development (Schumpeter, 
1934/1982), which was first published in 1911, and Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 
(Schumpeter, 1942/1994), which was first published in 1942.  He argued that macroeconomic 
equilibrium obtains during normal times but that the successful introduction of new innovations 
or technologies (which he called “disruptive technologies”) by entrepreneurs forces already 
existing technologies and means of production to lose their positions within the economy, 
leading to “creative destruction.”  He argued that capitalism could only be understood as an 
evolutionary process of continuous innovation and creative destruction and hence can be 
regarded as the forefather of evolutionary economics.  I should note parenthetically that while 
the use of the word “destruction” might suggest that “creative destruction” is a bad thing, 
Schumpeter viewed it positively since it is what leads to the adoption of newer and better 
technologies. 
 
Moreover, Schumpeter believed that economic systems as a whole also evolve, just as Marx did, 
and predicted that competition would force firms to co-opt entrepreneurs, which in turn would  
destroy their entrepreneurial spirit and ultimately lead to the demise of capitalism.  Thus, both 
Marx and Schumpeter believed that economic systems as a whole evolve and that capitalism 
would be replaced by socialism, but they differed with respect to the mechanism that they 
thought would cause this transition and with respect to whether or not it was desirable, with 
Marx rejoicing in the demise of capitalism and Schumpeter bemoaning it. 
 
For the most part, however, economists such as Marx, Schumpeter, and their immediate 
followers used evolutionary theory only as a metaphor or analogy without any explicit attempt to 
link economic behavior directly to the implications of biological Darwinian theory for human and 
social behavior.  Many of Darwin’s observations on human sociality, cooperation, and altruism, 
as contained in his other great work, The Descent of Man (Darwin, 1871), are only now being 
seriously incorporated into economic thinking in what is now called evolutionary economics 
proper. 
  
Whereas Schumpeter can be regarded as the harbinger of evolutionary economics, the 
American economists Richard R. Nelson (1930-   ) and Sidney G. Winter (1935-  ) are widely 
regarded as the fathers of this new field of evolutionary economics.  They applied the concept of 
evolution to firms in their book An Evolutionary Theory of Economic Change (Nelson and Winter, 
1982).  They argued that more successful firms (firms that have found innovative (or imitative) 
solutions to improve their profits) would grow at the expense of less successful firms, at times 
driving less successful firms out of business altogether. 
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Thus, economists have applied the concept of evolution to individuals (as in the case of 
Spencer), to technologies (as in the case of Schumpeter), to firms (as in the case of Nelson and 
Winter) ,and even to economic systems as a whole (as in the case of Marx and Schumpeter), 
but as I have tried to show, technology plays an especially crucial role in the evolution of 
economies and economic growth, which is why it is highly appropriate that the Vea family has 
endowed a Professorial Chair in Technology and Evolutionary Economics.  Like everything else, 
technology evolves over time, with newer and better technologies driving out older and inferior 
ones, and this in turn leads to increases in productivity (or equivalently, reductions in production 
costs), improvements in product quality, and the development of new goods and services, all of 
which lead to economic growth and improvements in people’s quality of life.  To put it another 
way, technology increases the size of the pie that can be baked from a given amount of capital, 
labor, and other factors of production so that everyone can have more pie without taking any 
away from others.  Technology is a “magic pill” for achieving economic growth because it can 
get you something for nothing. 
 
Schumpeter fully recognized the importance of the role played by technological innovation in 
economic growth, and lamented the fact that neoclassical economics did not adequately 
address technological innovation and, in effect, assumed an economic world that is free of 
innovation. “Schumpeter’s challenge”, so-called, was to create a theoretical framework for 
analyzing innovation-driven economic growth.  This is the most important raison d’etre for 
evolutionary economics, and it is in this sense that Schumpeter can be considered to be the 
forefather of evolutionary economics. 
 
 
THE INADEQUACIES OF NEOCLASSICAL ECONOMICS 
 
With this as historical background, in the remainder of this lecture, I would like to introduce you 
to evolutionary economics by first discussing the two most serious defects of neoclassical 
economics and of the neoclassical theory of household behavior and then discussing how 
evolutionary economics has tried to improve upon neoclassical economics by correcting these 
defects.  I will try to argue that the ultimate goal of evolutionary economics is to develop a 
complete theoretical alternative to neoclassical economics that remedies the two major defects 
of neoclassical economics. 
 
(1) ITS UNREALISTIC BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The first major defect of neoclassical economics is that it is a deeply flawed theory of human 
behavior and of the behavior of human organizations in any context, static or dynamic, because 
it makes behavioral assumptions that are not realistic or empirically grounded.  For example, it 
assumes that households maximize utility and that firms maximize profits, even though it is 
highly unlikely that households and firms have the enormous information-gathering and 
information-processing capabilities needed to maximize their utility or their profits.  Evolutionary 
economics has tried to remedy this defect by making more realistic and empirically grounded 
assumptions about household and firm behavior—in particular, by assuming that both 
households and firms suffer from “bounded rationality” and “satisfice” instead of maximizing 
utility or profits (more on this later). 
 
(2) ITS FAILURE TO ADDRESS TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
 
The other major defect of neoclassical economics is that it assumes that economies are static 
and free of technological innovation, even though economics are dynamic and technological 
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innovation plays a crucial role in economic growth and development.  Evolutionary economics 
has tried to remedy this defect by developing a dynamic theory of capitalist economies that are 
always in motion and always generating and reacting to technological innovations of all types. 
 
 
THE INADEQUACIES OF THE NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR 
 
Turning our attention to household behavior, which is the main focus of my own research and of 
today’s lecture, the neoclassical theory of household behavior suffers from the same two 
defects from which neoclassical economics as a whole suffers—namely, that it makes 
behavioral assumptions about household behavior that are not realistic or empirically grounded 
and that it is static rather than dynamic and, in particular, that it does not adequately address 
the reaction of households to the introduction of new goods and services. 
 
(1) ITS UNREALISTIC BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
The key assumption of the neoclassical theory of household behavior is that households pick 
their consumption bundles optimally (i.e., so as to maximize their utility).  The problem with this 
assumption is that it is unrealistic due to the presence of “bounded rationality,” a concept 
borrowed from the Carnegie School of Herbert A. Simon (1916-2001) (Simon, 1955, 1959), the 
winner of the 1978 Nobel Prize in Economics, and others.  Simon argued that, in order to make 
decisions rationally and to maximize their utility, individuals need to identify all possible 
alternatives, determine the consequences of each alternative, and select the alternative that 
confers the greatest utility on them.  This requires an almost infinite amount of information and 
information-gathering and information-processing capabilities, which human beings do not have 
due to their “bounded rationality.”  Thus, he argued, individuals are forced to settle for 
“satisficing” (a portmanteau of the words “satisfy” and “suffice”) rather than utility maximization, 
searching through the available alternatives until an acceptability threshold is met rather than 
searching through all possible alternatives and picking the one that maximizes their utility, 
thereby making the decision-making process much simpler, shorter, and more manageable.2 
 
Nelson and Consoli (2010), who can be regarded as the fathers of the evolutionary theory of 
household behavior, as explained later, acknowledge that the neoclassical theory of household 
behavior may not be a bad approximation of reality in the case of relatively small changes in the 
prices of goods and services with which households have considerable experience, where 
“changing the mix” is all that is required.  However, they argue that their own theory based on 
bounded rationality has at least as much explanatory power even in this case and that it is 
based on much more plausible and empirically grounded assumptions.   
 
(2) ITS FAILURE TO ADDRESS TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION 
 
The other major defect of the neoclassical theory of household behavior is that it does not 
incorporate the reaction of consumers to the introduction of new goods and services even 
though, as evolutionary economists emphasize, technological innovation plays a central role in 
economic growth and development and a significant portion of technological innovation in 
capitalist economies consists of the development of new goods and services.  The neoclassical 
                                                 
2 The late José Encarnación, Jr., long-serving dean of the School of Economics of the University of the Philippines , 
was himself an adherent and prominent advocate of “satisficing” behavior, as can be seen in his theory of L*-
ordering, or threshold-augmented lexicographic preferences.  See, e.g., Encarnación (1964). 
 
6 
 
theory of household behavior may do an adequate job of addressing, predicting, and explaining 
the response of households to changes in the prices of familiar goods and services but does not 
address the response of households to the introduction of entirely new goods and services. 
 
The problem, as pointed out by Nelson and Consoli (2010, p. 284), ”is that “[neoclassical] 
theory represses the uncertainties, and the time involved, for households to make significant 
changes in their patterns of behavior, particularly when these entail learning about and learning 
to do new things.  We note two important weaknesses of neoclassical theory here.  One is the 
assumption that households have well defined preferences regarding goods and services they 
never have experienced [or do not yet exist].  The second is failure to recognize that even 
awareness of choice sets is to a considerable extent dependent on what has in fact been 
chosen, and the process of choosing.”  In reality, preferences will be influenced by which goods 
and services households have already experienced and which they have not yet experienced, 
meaning that preferences will be endogenous, path-dependent, and potentially unstable. 
 
To put it another way, learning (i.e., learning about, learning to use, and learning the value of 
new goods and services) is ignored in the neoclassical theory of household behavior.  Moreover, 
neoclassical theory is also deficient in assuming that household preferences are fixed and 
ignoring the possibility that new wants emerge from time to time and that these new wants often 
lead to the emergence of new goods and services capable of meeting those wants. (See Witt 
(2001) for more on the concept of wants and how new wants can prevent consumption from 
becoming satiated despite the growth of per capita income.) 
 
 
THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR 
 
Next, I would like to discuss the evolutionary theory of household behavior and show how it 
remedies the two major defects of the neoclassical theory of household behavior. 
 
Until recently, evolutionary economists have focused mostly on the supply side—namely, firm 
behavior and technological innovation—and have paid little attention to the demand side, 
especially household behavior.  But this is an important omission because a significant portion 
of technological innovation in capitalist economies consists of the development of new goods 
and services, as a result of which a theory that realistically describes how consumers react to 
new goods and services is badly needed.  Fortunately, Richard R. Nelson and Davide Consoli 
published a paper entitled “An Evolutionary Theory of Consumption Behavior” in the Journal of 
Evolutionary Economics in 2010 (Nelson and Consoli, 2010) that addresses this very topic and 
propose the broad outlines of a behavioral or evolutionary theory of household behavior that 
does not suffer from the two major defects of neoclassical household behavior discussed above. 
 
One option is to have separate theories to deal with dynamic contexts in which change, 
especially technological innovation, is rapid and another to deal with static contexts in which 
change is slower or more episodic, but Nelson and Consoli (2010) start with the assumption that 
a unified theory that can explain household consumption behavior in all contexts is preferable to 
having separate theories for different contexts.   
 
To briefly summarize Nelson and Consoli’s (2010) proposed theoretical framework, they argue 
that the assumption that households have a stable, well-defined general utility function and 
maximize their utility subject to a budget constraint is unrealistic and assume instead that “a 
household has a set of particular wants it attends and that the goods and services it purchases 
are intended for use in meeting those wants (Nelson and Consoli, 2010, p. 670),” and that 
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households can judge at least roughly whether, and to what extent, particular wants are being 
met, given what they know and believe. 
 
Nelson and Consoli (2010, p. 673) acknowledge that there is a continuum among types of 
purchases of goods and services but they find it useful nonetheless to “make a distinction 
between circumstances where the purchases of goods and services are largely a matter of 
routine, involving little in the way of self-conscious selection, and circumstances which require 
the household to dedicate a certain amount of thought and effort to deciding what to do.”3  
Examples of the latter include circumstances that require households to engage in certain 
activities for the first time such as buying baby goods for their first baby and circumstances that 
require a major commitment of resources such as the purchase of cars and other big-ticket 
items, but the best example is circumstances that involve the purchase of newly introduced 
goods or services.  Households need to do a substantial amount of learning when new goods 
and services are introduced (about what wants the good or service satisfies, how to use the 
good or service, etc.), especially if the new good or service is unlike any existing good or service. 
Thus new goods and services provide challenges as well as opportunities and require a 
considerable amount of learning on the part of households. 
 
 
MORE ON BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 
(1) LOSS AVERSION 
 
Getting back to our discussion of the objections evolutionary economists have to the 
neoclassical assumption of utility maximization by households, another objection they have is 
that other assumptions may be more relevant depending on the environment in which the 
individual or household is placed.  For example, when an individual is living at a subsistence 
level where a reduction in resources may mean death, it may be rational for him or her to place 
greater value on losses than on gains (i.e., to exhibit loss aversion). 
 
The concept of “loss aversion” was first proposed by Daniel Kahneman (1934-    ) and Amos 
Nathan Tversky (1937-1996), a renowned team of psychologists and behavioral economists 
(one Israeli-American and the other Israeli), the former of whom received the 2002 Nobel Prize 
in Economics, in Kahneman and Tversky (1984).  “Loss aversion” refers to the fact that the 
decrease in an individual’s utility from losing 1000 pesos is greater than the increase in that 
individual’s utility from winning 1000 pesos.  This tendency has been observed in numerous 
economic experiments although there have been some experiments that find no evidence of 
loss aversion, and even one experiment that used non-human subjects (capuchin monkeys) 
found evidence of loss aversion.  This widely observed empirical regularity can be explained by 
evolutionary economics but not by neoclassical economics. 
 
(2) SELF-INTEREST VS. ALTRUISM 
 
Yet another objection that evolutionary economists raise to the behavioral assumptions of 
neoclassical household theory is that it assumes that individuals are completely selfish, caring 
only about themselves and deriving utility only from their own consumption, even though 
individuals often exhibit cooperative or altruistic behavior in the real world.  These behaviors are 
                                                 
3 This is reminiscent of the neuroscientific distinction Daniel Kahneman makes in his book Thinking, Fast and Slow 
(Kahneman, 2011) between “System 1” and “System 2” thinking.  The former is almost automatic and uses 
heuristics, while the latter is deliberate and logical and requires effort. 
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difficult to explain using neoclassical economists but they can easily be explained using 
evolutionary biology.  Here are a few examples of seemingly altruistic or cooperative behaviors 
in the animal world than can be explained by evolutionary biology. 
 
(1) Kin selection.  If individuals are concerned not about maximizing their own utility but about 
perpetuating their own genes, they may sacrifice their own life in order to save the life of a 
blood relative because doing so will help perpetuate their own genes, a phenomenon that is 
called “kin selection.”  To cite an example of this phenomenon in the animal world, the male 
Australian redback spider (Latrodectus hasselti) "somersaults" and twists his abdomen 
directly onto the fangs of his mate while copulating, and approximately 65% of males are 
consumed by their mates at this stage.  Males that "sacrifice" themselves in this manner 
enhance the survival prospects of their own genes because the mother of their progeny will 
be better nourished as a result of their sacrifice and be more likely to give birth to healthy 
progeny.   
 
(2) Reciprocal altruism.  Individuals who want to perpetuate their own genes may help a 
complete stranger to survive in the expectation that the stranger will return the favor in the 
future when one’s own life is in danger, a phenomenon that is called “reciprocal altruism.”  
One example of this phenomenon in the animal world is that of vampire bats.  Vampire bats 
commonly regurgitate blood to share with unlucky or sick roost mates that have been unable 
to obtain enough blood on their own, presumably in the expectation that the beneficiary of 
their generosity will return the favor when the tables are turned.   
 
(3) Group selection.  An individual may help ensure the survival of the group to which it 
belongs, whether or not the other members are their blood relatives, since enhancing the 
survival prospects of the group as a whole will enhance the survival prospects of each 
member of the group including the individual himself or herself, a phenomenon that is called 
“group selection.”  To cite two examples of this phenomenon in the animal world, wolves 
hang out in packs because this facilitates the capture of prey, and conversely, chimpanzees 
live in groups because this provides a more effective defense against predators and 
promotes the defense of valuable territory.  To cite another example, vervet monkeys give 
alarm calls to warn fellow monkeys of the presence of predators, thereby enhancing the 
survival prospects of the group as a whole, even though in doing so they attract attention to 
themselves, thereby increasing their personal chance of being attacked.   
 
As these examples illustrate, there are many examples of seemingly altruistic or cooperative 
behaviors in the animal world, but they can be explained via self-interest if we assume that 
animals are selfish in the sense that they care about the perpetuation of their own genes (or of 
the group to which they belong).4 
 
Our discussion has focused thus far on examples from the animal world, but I would now like to 
turn to examples from human behavior.  There is no doubt that humans engage in seemingly 
altruistic or cooperative behaviors to the same extent as, or to a greater extent than, animals.  
To cite a few examples, humans make enormous sacrifices for their children’s education and 
                                                 
4 Some writers would dispute whether selfishness should include behavior in favor of group selection.  They would 
argue that individual sacrifice in favor of group survival is actually a form of altruism, especially in cases in which 
other group members are not genetically related, as in human society.  On the other hand, it can be argued that an 
ant or bee colony can be regarded as being one giant organism that is behaving selfishly.  Richard Dawkins {the 
author of The Selfish Gene (Dawkins, 2006)) is the most prominent opponent of the idea of group selection whereas 
Edward O. Wilson is its greatest defender (see, e.g., Wilson, 2012). 
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well-being, they leave large bequests to their spouses and children, they make large 
contributions to various charitable organizations, they volunteer large amounts of their time and 
labor to helping others, they donate their organs, bone marrow, and blood to complete strangers, 
etc., etc.  Thus, human behavior is seemingly at odds with the neoclassical assumption of utility 
maximization. 
 
Note, however, that seemingly altruistic or cooperative behaviors can be selfishly motivated in 
the case of humans as well.  The best example of this is Becker’s (1991, Chapter 8) “Rotten Kid 
Theorem,” which states that the child of an altruistic parent will exhibit seemingly altruistic 
behavior (at least with respect to the maximization of family income) no matter how selfish he or 
she is. 
 
In the context of bequests, a parent who leaves a bequest to his or her child is selfishly 
motivated if the bequest is a quid pro quo for nursing care, financial assistance, visits, phone 
calls, etc., from that child during old age (i.e., if the threat of disinheritance is used to induce 
their child to provide care and/or attention during old age) (Bernheim, Shleifer, and Summers 
(1985) conduct a theoretical and empirical analysis of this case, which they call the “strategic 
bequest motive”).  To cite another example, a parent who leaves a bequest to his or her child is 
selfishly motivated if the bequest is a quid pro quo for carrying on the family line and/or the 
family business (Chu (1991) construct a theoretical model of this case, which he calls 
“primogeniture” and which has also been referred to as the “dynasty model”).  Using the 
terminology we used in the case of the animal world, the first example can be regarded as an 
example of kin selection (because parents help their children, with whom they share half of their 
genes, to survive and conversely) or as an example of reciprocal altruism (because children 
help their parents to survive in anticipation of having the favor returned in the form of a bequest), 
and the second example can be regarded as an example of kin selection (because parents are 
primarily concerned about the perpetuation of their genes).  Thus, both examples of seemingly 
altruistic behavior are actually selfishly motivated and possibly motivated by a desire to 
perpetuate one’s own genes. 
 
A bequest from the parent to his or her child can be regarded as being altruistically motivated 
only if the parent does not demand any quid pro quo in exchange for leaving a bequest to his or 
her children and leaves the bequest out of love for his or her children (Becker (1991, Chapter 8) 
constructs a theoretical model of this case).   
 
Since some bequest motives are consistent with self-interest and some with altruism, we need 
information not only on whether or not people leave bequests but also on their motives for 
leaving bequests in order to know whether or not their behavior is consistent with self-interest or 
altruism.   
 
Fortunately, such data are available in a household survey called the “Preference Parameters 
Study of Osaka University,” which was conducted in 4 countries by a team from Osaka 
University of which I was a member.  This survey asked respondents about their bequest 
motives, asking them to choose from among the following choices: 
 
(Responses consistent with altruism) 
(1) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) no matter what.  
(2) I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances 
because doing so may reduce their will to work.  
 
(Responses consistent with self-interest) 
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(3) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide care (including 
nursing care) during old age.  
(4) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they provide financial assistance 
during old age.  
(5) I do not plan to make special efforts to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) but will 
leave whatever is left over.5  
(6) I do not plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) under any circumstances 
because I want to use my wealth myself.  
(7) I plan to leave an inheritance to my child(ren) only if they carry on the family 
business.  
 
We found that respondents with an altruistic bequest motive (viz., respondents planning to leave 
a bequest to their children even if they receive nothing in return and respondents not planning to 
leave a bequest to their children because doing so may reduce their will to work, options 1-2) 
were prevalent in all four countries but especially in India and the United States, with 75.8% of 
Indians and 67.0% of Americans having such altruistic bequest motives.  This proportion was 
much lower but still sizable in China and Japan (37.4% in China and 34.0% in Japan).  By 
contrast, respondents with a selfish bequest motive (viz., respondents not planning to leave a 
bequest at all to their children and respondents planning to leave a bequest to their children only 
if they receive some sort of quid pro quo from their children, options 3-7) were in the majority in 
China and Japan (62.6% and 66.0%, respectively) but in the minority in India and the United 
States (24.2% and 33.0%, respectively) (Horioka, 2014).  The fact that altruistic individuals are 
in the majority in the United States and India and constitute a sizable minority in China and 
Japan suggests that the degree of applicability of the neoclassical assumption of self-interest 
varies greatly from country to country but that it is not predominant in any country. 
 
[Insert Figure 1 about here.] 
 
Horioka (2014) conducts a comprehensive survey of more formal econometric tests of whether 
parents and children are selfishly or altruistically motivated and finds that Americans are largely 
altruistically motivated whereas Japanese are largely selfishly motivated, a result that is 
consistent with the findings from the Osaka University survey discussed above. 
 
Evidence from economic experiments also sheds light on whether or not people are selfish or 
altruistic.  Take as an example the dictator game, a game in which player 1 is required to decide 
how to allocate 1000 pesos between himself/herself and player 2, and player 2 simply receives 
what player 1 allocates to him/her.  Player 1 can keep all 1000 pesos for himself/herself, give all 
1000 pesos to player 2, or keep part of the 1000 pesos and give the rest to player 2.  If player 1 
is selfish, he/she should keep all 1000 pesos for himself/herself and give nothing to player 2, but 
in virtually all cases, player 1 gives at least part of the 1000 pesos (sometimes as much as 50 
percent) to player 2, suggesting that he/she is at least partly altruistic.   
 
A particularly striking falsification of the neoclassical assumption of self-interested behavior 
among humans is presented in a well-known work by Henrich (2001) and Henrich, et al. (2005) 
(see also de Dios, 2008).  The authors observe how experimental subjects in fifteen small-scale 
primitive societies from throughout the world (Africa, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea, South 
America, etc.) play the ultimatum, public goods, and dictator games and find that the selfishness 
axiom is violated almost consistently across these societies, with few, if any, of the subjects in 
                                                 
5  This option may be consistent with altruism if the rest of the money is given to charitable organizations or 
foundations, as in the case of Warren Buffett or Bill Gates. 
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these societies offering nothing to player 2 in the dictator game.  Moreover, the authors find that 
the degree of unselfishness varies with the degree of cooperation required for survival in a 
particular society as well as with how much experience the society has had with market 
exchange.  
 
Evolutionary economists are therefore justified in criticizing the neoclassical assumption of self-
interest and the fact that evolutionary economics can explain selfish behavior, seemingly 
altruistic behavior that is actually selfishly motivated, and genuinely altruistic behavior makes it 
more realistic than neoclassical economics. 
 
 
THE VERDICT ON THE EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF HOUSEHOLD BEHAVIOR 
 
In sum, Nelson and Consoli’s (2010) theory of household behavior is superior to the 
neoclassical theory because its assumptions are realistic and empirically grounded, because it 
incorporates technological innovation, the new goods and services that technological innovation 
often produces, and changes in preferences and wants and because it incorporates learning 
into the decision-making process.   
 
However, the Friedmanesque challenge to all attempts to change behavioral axioms has always 
been to show that they make a difference in terms of observable behavior and result in better 
predictions. The burden of proof is on evolutionary economists to demonstrate that their theory 
has observational implications that are different from those of neoclassical theory and that their 
observational implications are verified empirically.  Going back to our earlier discussion of 
bequest motives, we would expect households with bequest motives to have higher saving rates 
than households without bequest motives.  And indeed Horioka, et al. (2002) find, as expected, 
that, in Japan, households with bequest motives have a higher rate of accumulation (saving 
rate) than households without bequest motives and that the difference is proportional to the 
magnitude of their intended bequest.  This is one example of a case in which alternatives to 
neoclassical theory have observational implications that are different from those of neoclassical 
theory and in which these observational implications have been tested and verified. 
 
 
EVOLUTIONARY ECONOMICS VS. BEHAVIORAL ECONOMICS 
 
Before ending, let me say a word about the connection between evolutionary economics and 
behavioral economics.  Evolutionary economics and behavioral economics are very closely 
related to one another and specialists in the two fields are on very good terms with one another 
because they have a common enemy—namely, neoclassical economics!  Their common goal is 
to improve upon neoclassical economics by making it more realistic, and they differ only in 
emphasis.  Namely, evolutionary economists place more emphasis on making neoclassical 
economics more dynamic and incorporating technological innovation whereas behavioral 
economists place more emphasis on making the behavioral assumptions of neoclassical 
economics such as the assumption of selfish utility maximization by households more realistic 
and empirically grounded. 
 
 
SUMMARY 
 
As I have tried to show in this lecture, evolutionary economics is an important, promising, and 
growing field of economics that vastly improves upon neoclassical economics by incorporating 
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more realistic and empirically grounded behavioral assumptions and technological innovation.  It 
is therefore much better able to explain and predict economic behavior and is able to explain 
and predict a broader range of economic behaviors than neoclassical economics.  It is indeed 
fortunate for the School of Economics of the University of the Philippines and for the economics 
profession as a whole that the Vea family had the generosity and foresight to endow the Vea 
Family Professorial Chair in Technology and Evolutionary Economics Centennial and to 
encourage teaching and research in this important, promising, and growing field of economics. 
For that we are eternally grateful.   
 
Thank you very much for your kind attention. 
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Figure 1: An International Comparison of Bequest Motives 
 
 
 
Notes: The blue bars show the proportion of respondents having an altruistic bequest motive, 
while the red bars show the proportion of  respondents having a selfish bequest motive.  The 
denominator excludes those who did not respond to the question about bequest motives and 
those who replied that they want to leave a bequest to their child(ren) but won't because they 
don't have the financial capacity to do so. 
 
Data Source: 2012 Preference Parameter Survey of Osaka University  (Kurashi to Konomi to 
Manzokudo ni tsuite no Anke-to Chousa) except for rural China, for which the 2010 survey was 
used.  The results for the urban and rural surveys for China and India were weighted by the 
proportions of the urban and rural populations in each country (52/48% in China and 32/68% in 
India). 
China India Japan U.S.
Altruistic bequest motive 37.40 75.80 33.98 66.97
Selfish bequest motive 62.60 24.20 66.02 33.03
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